Peter Hanks: The Classificatory Conception of Propositional Content
Duration: 45 mins 17 secs
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| Description: |
This a talk from 'Intentionality: New Directions', a workshop on intentionality, the mind’s capacity to represent the world. The workshop took place at Peterhouse, Cambridge, 21-23 March 2017, as part of the New Directions in the Study of the Mind project, supported by the John Templeton Foundation. (Due to a recording error, the first 1:20 of this talk is of lower quality).
Image: Compass Study, Calsidyrose. |
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| Created: | 2017-04-08 22:10 |
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| Collection: | Intentionality: New Directions |
| Publisher: | University of Cambridge |
| Copyright: | Faculty of Philosophy |
| Language: | eng (English) |
| Distribution: |
World
(downloadable)
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| Explicit content: | No |
| Abstract: | What does it mean for a mental state or an utterance to “have propositional content”? Here I contrast three different answers to this question, which I will call the Fregean, Russellian, and classificatory conceptions of propositional content. According to the Fregean conception, propositions are the primary bearers of representational features and truth-conditions, and mental states and utterances inherit these features from propositions. According to the Russellian conception, propositions are what we represent in our mental states and utterances — they are what these states and utterances are directed at. According to the classificatory conception, propositions are classificatory devices, which we use to identify and individuate our mental states and utterances. After raising problems for the Fregean and Russellian approaches I will explore the consequences of the classificatory conception for our view of propositional attitudes and speech acts. |
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