Laura Gow: Perceptual Experience - Non-relationalism without Adverbialism
Duration: 40 mins 51 secs
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| Description: |
This a talk from 'Intentionality: New Directions', a workshop on intentionality, the mind’s capacity to represent the world. The workshop took place at Peterhouse, Cambridge, 21-23 March 2017, as part of the New Directions in the Study of the Mind project, supported by the John Templeton Foundation.
Image: Compass Study, Calsidyrose. |
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| Created: | 2017-04-08 14:08 |
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| Collection: | Intentionality: New Directions |
| Publisher: | University of Cambridge |
| Copyright: | Faculty of Philosophy |
| Language: | eng (English) |
| Distribution: |
World
(downloadable)
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| Explicit content: | No |
| Abstract: | Representationalism is often marketed as being the position of choice for anyone seeking a physicalist account of perceptual experience, particularly when hallucinations and illusions are included among the experiences which our account is required to explain. This view has recently come under attack, and in the first part of this paper I offer an explanation of why standard representationalism is fundamentally unable to meet the demands of a genuinely physicalist metaphysics. Ultimately, this is due to its failure to move away from a relational conception of perceptual experience. I consider the existing non-relational views which have arisen as a response to the metaphysical objections to standard representationalism, and point out some problems with them. In most cases, the problems are due to the views in question being modelled on adverbialism. I present a new non-relational view of perceptual experience which escapes these problems. |
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