Systemic Risk with Central Counterparty Clearing

33 mins 41 secs,  128.88 MB,  iPod Video  480x270,  29.97 fps,  44100 Hz,  522.39 kbits/sec
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Description: Amini, H (EPFL - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne)
Friday 29 August 2014, 09:45-10:15
 
Created: 2014-08-29 16:15
Collection: Systemic Risk: Mathematical Modelling and Interdisciplinary Approaches
Publisher: Isaac Newton Institute
Copyright: Amini, H
Language: eng (English)
Distribution: World     (downloadable)
Explicit content: No
Aspect Ratio: 16:9
Screencast: No
Bumper: UCS Default
Trailer: UCS Default
 
Abstract: This paper studies financial networks in a stochastic framework. We measure systemic risk in terms of a risk adjusted valuation principle. The framework allows us to examine the effects on systemic risk and price contagion of multilateral clearing via a central clearing counterparty (CCP). We prove existence and uniqueness of an interbank payment equilibrium in conjunction with the price impact on external assets. We find that a CCP not always reduces systemic risk and provide sufficient conditions for the latter to hold. We derive the capitalization of a CCP based on game theoretic arguments. This is based on joint work with Damir Filipovic and Andreea Minca.
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