Intermediation and Voluntary Exposure to Counterparty Risk

46 mins 1 sec,  205.54 MB,  WebM  640x360,  29.97 fps,  44100 Hz,  609.85 kbits/sec
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Description: Farboodi, M (Princeton University)
Wednesday 27 August 2014, 09:00-09:30
 
Created: 2014-08-28 10:27
Collection: Systemic Risk: Mathematical Modelling and Interdisciplinary Approaches
Publisher: Isaac Newton Institute
Copyright: Farboodi, M
Language: eng (English)
Distribution: World     (downloadable)
Explicit content: No
Aspect Ratio: 16:9
Screencast: No
Bumper: UCS Default
Trailer: UCS Default
 
Abstract: I develop a model of the financial sector in which endogenous intermediation among debt financed banks generates excessive systemic risk. Financial institutions have incentives to capture intermediation spreads through strategic borrowing and lending decisions. By doing so, they tilt the division of surplus along an intermediation chain in their favor, while at the same time reducing aggregate surplus. I show that a core-periphery network -- few highly interconnected and many sparsely connected banks -- endogenously emerges in my model. The network is inefficient relative to a constrained efficient benchmark since banks who make risky investments "overconnect", exposing themselves to excessive counterparty risk, while banks who mainly provide funding end up with too few connections. The predictions of the model are consistent with empirical evidence in the literature.
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